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Abstract 
Joni Hokkanen, Ismo Linnosmaa, Markku Siikanen. Long-run effects of the generic substitution policy on 
prices of branded and generic pharmaceuticals National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL). Discussion 
paper 3/2015. 43 pages. Helsinki, Finland 2016. 
ISBN 978-952-302-428-1 (online publication) 
 
 
In this paper we study the effects of generic substitution policy on brand-name (originator) and generic 
drug prices. Generic substitution policy was applied in 2003 in Finland. The Finnish framework provides a 
setting where only generic substitution was applied. Our theoretical model yields two different predictions 
for policy outcomes.  
According to the first prediction, the applied policy enhances the price competition in the markets and 
drug prices decrease for both generic and brand name products. The second prediction suggests that the 
market segments and brand name products are better off by keeping prices high. In the empirical section of 
the article, we estimate the policy effect with quasi-natural set-up and difference in difference –framework 
with long term effects. According to our results, both generics and brand name products decrease prices but 
generic prices fall notably more than brand names. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Joni Hokkanen, Ismo Linnosmaa, Markku Siikanen. Long-run effects of the generic substitution policy on 
prices of branded and generic pharmaceuticals. Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos (THL). Työpaperi 3/2015. 
43 sivua. Helsinki, 2016. 
ISBN 978-952-302-428-1 (verkkojulkaisu) 
Työssä selvitetään 2003 Suomessa käyttöön otetun lääkevaihdon (geneerisen substituution) vaikutusta 
geneeristen ja alkuperäislääkkeiden hintoihin. Suomessa lääkevaihtoa on mahdollista tutkia luonnollisen 
eksperimentin keinoin, koska lääkevaihdon yhteydessä muut tekijät pysyivät muuttumattomina. Useissa 
tapauksissa lääkevaihdon yhteydessä on otettu käyttöön myös viitehintamekanismi, jolloin lääkevaihdon 
vaikutusten estimointi on mahdotonta. Teoreettinen mallinnus tuottaa kaksi erilaista ennustetta politiikan 
vaikutuksille.  
Ensimmäisen ennusteen mukaan lääkevaihdon käyttöön otto lisää hintakilpailua molemmissa ryhmissä, 
sekä geneerisessä että alkuperäislääkkeissä. Toisessa tasapainossa ennuste on, että markkinoiden 
jakaantuessa alkuperäislääkkeet pitävät hinnat korkealla, eivätkä ne osallistu hintakilpailuun geneeristen 
tuotteiden kanssa. Empiirisessä osassa estimoidaan difference-in-difference –menetelmällä pitkän aikavälin 
politiikkavaikutukset hintoihin. Tulokset tukevat ensimmäistä teoreettista ennustetta: sekä alkuperäisten 
että geneeristen hinnat laskevat mutta geneeristen hinnat laskevat huomattavasti enemmän kuin 
alkuperäislääkkeiden. 
Asiasanat: Geneerinen substituutio, lääkevaihto, difference-in-difference, lääkemarkkinat, lääkepolitiikka 
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Introduction 
Spending on pharmaceuticals has been one of the fastest growing components of health care expenditures 
in several European countries. Average growth of per capita expenditures on pharmaceuticals reached close 
to 50% from 1995–2005 (Kanavos et al., 2008, Galizzi et al., 2011) and per capita average spending was 
EUR 349 in 2012 in the EU25 countries. Since pharmaceutical expenditures are financed mainly from the 
public purse (on average 73% OECD: 2012), the development has led to the implementation of cost 
containment measures. Cost containment instruments are variations and combinations of reference pricing 
systems with generic substitution (Schulenburg et al., 2011).  
The aim of generic substitution (henceforth GS) is to increase consumer awareness of the available 
generic alternatives, substitute cheaper generic products for more expensive branded products and intensify 
price competition. Reference pricing (henceforth RP) has similar objectives, but the system creates stronger 
incentives for patients to choose cheaper alternatives than GS, since reference pricing increases patients 
out-of-pocket cost if the physician prescribed a more expensive drug outside of the reference price drugs. If 
the patient refuses substitution proposed in the pharmacy, the patient pays the price difference between the 
producer price and reference price.  
Policy evaluation studies have focused more on reference pricing than on generic substitution (see e.g. 
Brekke et al., 2009 and 2011; Pavcnik 2007; Grootendorst and Stewart 2005), since in most cases generic 
substitution has been part of the reference pricing policy and the pure system of generic substitution has 
seldom been applied. Our goal is to fill this gap by examining the causal effects of a pure generic 
substitution policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals. 
Buzzelli et al. (2006) studied the effects of the GS policy on prices and expenditures in 16 OECD 
countries. According to their results, the policy reduced prices by 3.1% and pharmaceutical expenditures by 
1.6%, although the effect on pharmaceutical expenditures was not statistically significant. Aalto-Setälä 
(2008) examined the price effects of market competition after the implementation of the GS policy in 
Finland in a one-year period from May 2003–April 2004. His results show that the number of firms and 
prices are inversely related, and the price-reduction effect of the market structure is larger among expensive 
substitute groups than among low-priced substitute groups.  
Andersson et al. (2007) and Granlund (2010) study the effects of the generic substitution reform 
introduced in Sweden in October 2002. Andersson et al. (2007) showed that both patients and health 
insurance (Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme) benefitted from the introduction of the GS reform. The reform 
was associated with a significant decline in the growth rates of patients’ co-payments and the subsidised 
costs of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. Granlund’s (2010) focus is on the price and welfare effects of 
the Swedish GS reform. He estimated the price effects of the GS reform with an econometric model, which 
allows for the evaluation of the long-term effects of the policy. According to his results, the average price 
reduction due to the GS policy in Sweden was 10% and the effect was significantly larger for branded 
products than for generic pharmaceuticals. The GS reform reduced prices by 1–2% within a one-month 
period, while the estimated long-term reduction in prices was in the range from 6% to 17% by the end of 
the 2007.  
Aalto-Setälä (2008) and Hokkanen et al. (2012) found contrary results to Granlund (2010) and 
Anderson et al. (2007). Their results showed a greater decrease of prices for generics than brand-name 
drugs after the implementation of the generic substitution policy in Finland. Kaiser et al. (2014) observed 
similar price behaviour with Danish data on statins, following a change from an external reference price 
system to an internal reference price.  
Although the applied research in the evaluation of the pharmaceutical policies has shown significant 
qualitative improvement in recent years, shortcomings still exist in the literature. First, because 
pharmaceutical firms can adjust their pricing behaviour more freely in the long-run, studies should focus on 
estimating the long-term policy effects. Secondly, policy evaluations may suffer from the fact that 
researchers make inferences about the policy effects in an environment where several other drivers than the 
Introduction 
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ones subject to the evaluation can affect the outcome variables. In such an environment, there should be an 
effort to estimate the incremental policy effect of the evaluated policy.    
In this paper we examine the price effects of the generic substitution (GS) policy implemented in 
Finland in 2003. Finland provides a good example for studying the effects of the GS policy, since the GS 
policy was introduced in Finland in 2003 and the reference pricing system later in 2009. Hence, the 
monetary incentives inducing the use of low-priced generic alternatives present in the RP system were not 
initially included in the Finnish generic substitution scheme. For this reason, we are able to estimate the 
effects of the pure generic substitution policy, while not being confounded by the previous or simultaneous 
policy applications. 
Our theoretical section proceeds by modelling a pharmaceutical market with loyal and price-sensitive 
consumers (Frank and Salkever 1992) choosing between brand name and generic drugs. The fraction of 
price-sensitive consumers is determined by the GS policy that informs consumers about the existence of 
generic alternatives in the market (see Granlund and Rudholm, 2011). We derive two predictions from the 
theoretical model. According to the first prediction, no market segmentation occurs, and brand name 
products compete with generic alternatives and all prices decline. The second prediction proposes a 
segmented outcome. If markets segment, brand names are better off by evading price competition with 
generics if they can charge a high price to loyal segment consumers and generic competition becomes 
fierce. 
In the empirical part of the study we utilize an extensive data set on prices and expenditures of 
prescription pharmaceuticals in Finland. Data includes 11 of the highest selling drug groups defined with a 
ATC level 3 (Anatomical therapeutic chemical classification, refers to  4-digit code)  and cover 23 per cent 
of all prescription drugs in Finland. We estimate the long run price-effects of the GS policy utilizing the 
principles presented by Wolfers (1996). According to our results, the GS policy reduced generic prices by a 
quarter on average in standard two-period modelling. The long-run estimates for the overall price reduction 
are significantly larger, as substitutable generic prices decline by 51 per cent. The separated brand name 
effect is close to zero and insignificant in the standard model, whereas long-term estimates for the price 
decline is 31 per cent. Our estimates on the policy effects differ from estimates provided by Granlund 
(2010), which may be due to an application of different modelling techniques or different regulatory 
environments in Finland and Sweden. Regardless of our model specifications, generics decrease prices 
more than brand names within a substitutable drugs group. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the generic substitution policy and 
Finnish pharmaceutical markets. Section 3 derives theoretical predictions on the effects of the GS policy on 
the prices of branded and generic pharmaceuticals in a model with loyal and price-sensitive consumers. In 
Section 4 we describe the data, identification strategy, and econometric models that are utilized in the 
estimation of the GS policy effects. We utilize the difference-in-difference method with several post policy 
extensions. We will also display our main empirical results in Section four. We discuss the results to related 
studies in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes the article. 
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2. Finnish generic substitution system and
regulation in pharmaceutical markets
A programme of generic substitution (GS) was introduced in Finland in April 2003 and a reference-pricing 
scheme was added in March 2009. Manufacturers were free to set the wholesale prices both before and 
after the 2003 reform with one notable exception. Drugs reimbursable from the National Social Insurance 
Scheme were subject to a price-cap regulation. The price cap (reasonable wholesale price) is determined in 
negotiations between the pharmaceutical manufacturers and the Finnish Pharmaceutical Pricing Board 
(FPPB). In the application process, the firm proposes a price cap, which the FPPB accepts or rejects. An 
accepted price cap defines the maximum price of the pharmaceutical. Although the maximum wholesale 
prices are regulated, the price-cap regulation allows for a reduction in prices. There exist no price caps for 
pharmaceuticals outside the reimbursement scheme.  
Price regulation is essential in the Finnish pharmaceutical market because 77% of pharmaceuticals 
consumed in outpatient care were subject to reimbursement in 2004 from the National Social Insurance 
Scheme (Timonen et al., 2005). The reimbursement ratio has declined to 64% in 2013 (Finnish statistics on 
medicine 2014). Pharmaceutical reimbursements are divided into three classes: the basic refund category 
(42% of the retail price), the lower special refund category (72% of the retail price) and the higher special 
refund category (100% of the retail price) in 2004.
1
 The upper limit for out of pocket expenses was 
EUR 606.95 in 2005
2
 annually. Drug purchases above that limit are fully reimbursed to patients, with only 
a nominal fee of EUR 1.5 fee being charged at the pharmacy.  
Both the prescribing physician and the purchasing individual can decline the substitution. If the 
physician wants to prevent the replacement, it has to be done in advance, as pharmacists do not inform the 
physician if they made a replacement. The patient can decline substitution at the counter. If the patient 
declines the substitution, the potential saving arising from the consumption of a cheaper pharmaceutical is 
lost. In this respect, the denial of substitution was not costless for the patient. 
There were generic alternatives in the market even before the GS reform. The generic substitution 
scheme obliged pharmacists to propose a substitution for a drug to patients whenever physicians prescribed 
a product not in the so-called price corridor. The lower boundary of the price corridor was determined by 
the price of the cheapest substitutable medicinal product and the upper boundary by adding a regulated 
margin to the cheapest price. Between 2003 and 2009,
3
 the upper boundary of the corridor was determined 
by the cheapest price of a drug in the substitution group with an added margin of EUR 2 for products with a 
wholesale price of less than EUR 40. For pharmaceuticals that were more expensive, the additional margin 
was EUR 3. A substitutable drug was offered from products within the limits of the price corridor. The 
Finnish Medicines Agency (FIMEA) maintained and still maintains the list of substitutable medicinal 
products and updates it quarterly (Hartikainen-Herranen and Paldan, 2005). 
Since the government sets the fixed retail mark-ups for reimbursed drugs, price competition prevails 
only at the manufacturer level. Manufacturers have to sell the drugs at the same wholesale prices to all 
pharmacies, while pharmacies are only allowed to add a fixed mark-up to the wholesale prices (Timonen et 
al., 2005). The empirical analysis in the present paper will therefore focus on wholesale prices. 
1 In 2013, refund percentages decreased to 35%, 65% and 100% respectively 
2 Upper annual cost limit for the patient was EUR 700.92 in 2012, EUR 670.00 in 2013, and EUR 610.00 in 
2014 (Finnish statistics on medicines 2011; 2014).  
3 The price corridor narrowed 4/2009, the lower group from EUR 2 to EUR 1.50 and the upper group from 
EUR 3 to EUR 2 margins. 
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3. Theoretical model
To create theoretical predictions on the effects of generic substitution policy on the prices of the 
pharmaceutical products, we analyse competition between a branded pharmaceutical and n generic 
pharmaceuticals. We assume that all generic pharmaceuticals are homogeneous and yield the same health 
benefit for consumers, but the quality of the branded product, sb, differs from the quality of the generic 
pharmaceuticals, sg. It is assumed throughout the article that consumers perceive the quality of the branded 
pharmaceutical to be better than the quality the generic pharmaceuticals and 0 ≤ sg < sb. The assumption on 
the perceived quality differences has been adopted by several researchers examining pharmaceutical 
markets (see e.g. Cabrales, 2003; Jelovac and Bordoy, 2005; Brekke et al., 2007). In what follows, the 
index {b,g,0}j makes a distinction between the branded pharmaceutical, the generic pharmaceuticals, 
and the outside option, and the index i = 1,2,0…,n refers to n generic pharmaceuticals. 
We consider a pharmaceutical market with a heterogeneous consumer population, the size of which is 
normalized to one. We assume that all consumers suffer from a disease and are patients. Patients differ in 
terms of their willingness-to-pay for quality θ, which is assumed to follow the uniform distribution with the 
support in [0,1]. 
Following Frank and Salkever (1992), the market consists of both loyal and price-sensitive patients. The 
fraction of price-sensitive (loyal) patients in the market is [0,1] (1 ).   The fraction of price-sensitive 
patients Φ is determined by the generic substitution policy of the government, the role of which is to inform 
patients about the existence of generic alternatives and facilitate the use of generic pharmaceuticals (see 
Granlund 2010; Rudholm 2007). 
Price-sensitive consumers have n+2 alternatives to choose from: the branded pharmaceutical with the 
out-of-pocket price λpb, where λ in [0,1] denotes coinsurance, generic pharmaceutical i =1,2,…,n with the 
out-of-pocket price λpi, or the outside option with no pharmaceutical consumption and zero reservation 
utility. All generic pharmaceuticals have the same quality and patients hence choose the one with the 
lowest price. The utility function of a price-sensitive patient with willingness-to-pay θ can be defined as 
follows 
,
( ) ,
0 , 0,
b b
s
g
s p if j b
U j s p if j g
if j
 
 
  

  


(1.1) 
where p = min{p1,p2,….,pn}. 
Loyal consumers consume either the branded pharmaceutical or the outside option. Their utility 
function is defined as follows 
,
( )
0 , 0.
b bl
s p if j b
U j
if j
  
 

(1.2) 
Both branded and generic pharmaceuticals are produced at constant marginal cost c, which is assumed 
to be zero. This assumption has become common in the theoretical analysis of the pharmaceutical market 
(Brekke et al. 2007; Jelovac and Bordoy 2005; Linnosmaa 2008) due to the low variable costs of 
manufacturing pharmaceuticals. We examine the market environment where the branded firm is a first-
mover setting the price of the branded product first, after which the price of generic pharmaceuticals is  
3. Theoretical model
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determined in a Cournot competition between the generic firms. This modelling strategy allows us to 
analyse the equilibrium prices of homogeneous generic products without committing to the extreme 
equilibrium predictions of marginal-cost pricing and zero profits. For similar modelling strategies see Kong 
(2009) and Regan (2008). The profit of generic firm i = 1,2,…,n is defined as follows 
( , ) ,i ip Q z q F   (1.3) 
where qi is the output of generic firm i = 1,2,….,n in the market, Q is the aggregate output of n generic 
firms, F is a fixed entry cost, and z contains other variables affecting the inverse demand function p(Q,z). 
The explicit form of the inverse demand function for generic pharmaceuticals p(Q,z) will be derived in the 
following section. Given that generic pharmaceuticals are homogeneous, the aggregate output is defined as 
the sum of the supply of individual products 
1
.
n
i
i
Q q


The profit function of the branded pharmaceutical is defined as follows: 
(1 ) ,l sb b b bp q q      (1.4) 
where qb
l
  and qb
s
  denote the demands of the branded pharmaceutical from the loyal and price-sensitive
segments of the market. These demands will also be derived in the following section. 
The following sections will analyse price competition between the branded and generic pharmaceuticals 
in order to derive theoretical predictions of the impact of generic substitution policy and market structure 
on prices of the branded and generic pharmaceuticals. Hence, we assume that both the generic substitution 
policy Φ and the number of firms (n+1firms) in the market are exogenously determined. In such an 
environment, we examine the following three-stage game. In Stage 1, the branded firm sets price pb. In 
Stage 2, and having observed the branded price, the generic pharmaceuticals choose quantities qi and the 
price of generic pharmaceuticals is realized. In Stage 3, patients choose between the alternative products 
available to them. We examine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium points for this three-stage game of 
perfect information. 
As is typical in analysing the SPNE points of multi-stage games, we begin by analysing the final stages 
of the game (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 2005). In our case, the first task is to analyse the demands for 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals. 
3.1 Demands for the branded and generic pharmaceuticals 
In the loyal segment of the market, patients compare the utility derived from the use of the branded 
pharmaceutical with the reservation utility of the outside option. Let θb0 denote the patient who is 
indifferent to both the branded product and the outside option. Such a patient can be identified by solving 
the equality sbθ – λpb = 0 with respect to θ. We then obtain θb0 = (λpb)/sb and qb
l 
= (1/sb)(sb – λpb), and the
demand for the branded pharmaceutical in the loyal segment of the market is 
 (1 ) 1 1 ,l bb
b
p
q
s
 
    
 
(1.5) 
given the fraction of loyal consumers 1-Φ and a uniform distribution of the willingness to pay. 
3. Theoretical model 
 
THL — Discussion paper 3/2015 11 
Long-run effects of the generic 
substitution policy on prices of branded 
and generic pharmaceuticals 
 
3.2 Adding price-sensitive patients  
 
In the price-sensitive segment of the market, patients may not consume either the branded or generic 
pharmaceuticals for some combination of prices pb and p. We begin the analysis by assuming that price-
sensitive patients buy both the branded and generic pharmaceuticals, and after that we examine the 
situation in which price-sensitive patients patronize either the generic products or the branded product. 
Standard results from the vertical differentiation literature (see e.g. Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Motta, 
1993) apply in the price-sensitive segment of the market. Let θbg and θg0 denote the marginal patients, who 
are indifferent to both the branded and the least expensive generic pharmaceutical and the generic 
pharmaceutical and the outside option, respectively. The patient θbg is identified by the equality sbθ – λpb = 
sgθ – λp, which yields θbg = (λ/Δ)(pb – p) where Δ ≡ sb – sg. Similarly, patient θg0 can be found by solving 
the equation sgθ – λp = 0, yielding θq0 = (λp)/sg. If the price of the branded pharmaceutical satisfies the 
condition (see Figure 1) 
 ,b b
g
s
p p p
s 
  
    
 
 (1.6) 
then price-sensitive patients compare the branded pharmaceutical, the least expensive of the generic 
pharmaceuticals and the outside option. Given the fraction of price-sensitive patients Φ, the demand for the 
generic products is defined as follows: 
  0 .bbg g b
g
s
Q p p
s

 
 
        
 (1.7) 
The aggregate demand for generic pharmaceuticals is positive only if Φ > 0. Assuming this to hold true, the 
inverse demand function for generic pharmaceuticals can be derived using the demand function (1.7). It is 
given as follows: 
 1 1( , ) .
g
b b
b
s
p p Q p p Q
s 
   
      
 (1.8) 
Under the condition (1.6) the total demand for the branded product is given as 
  0
( )
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 1 1 1 .l s b bb b b bg
b
p p p
q q
s
 
 
   
                
 (1.9) 
When the price of the branded pharmaceutical becomes sufficiently high, all (no) price-sensitive patients 
(patient) purchase(s) generic products (the branded product). The demand for the branded product in the 
price-sensitive segment of the market does not exist when the relative prices of the branded and generic 
products satisfy the condition [see Eq. (1.9)]  
 .bp p


   (1.10) 
Under the above condition, price-sensitive patients demand generic pharmaceuticals only. Their demand is 
given as Q = Φ(1 – θg0) = (Φ/sg)(sg – λp). The inverse demand function for generic pharmaceuticals can 
then be defined as follows:  
 
2 2 ( , ) 1 .
g
b
s Q
p p Q p

 
   
 
 (1.11) 
One should recall, however, that when condition (1.10) holds true, loyal patients are still in the market and 
their demand for the branded pharmaceutical is given by Eq. (1.5). 
3. Theoretical model
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Finally, when the price of the branded pharmaceutical becomes low relative to the price of the generic 
pharmaceuticals and pb ≤ (sb/sg)p (see Figure 1), all (no) price-sensitive patients (patient) purchase(s) the 
branded (generic) pharmaceutical. Under this condition, the demand for the branded product in the price-
sensitive market segment is  
0(1 ) 1 .
s b
b b
b
p
q
s


 
      
 
(1.12) 
In the loyal segment of the market, patients’ demand for the branded pharmaceutical is given by Eq. (1.5). 
Therefore, when pb ≤ (sb/sg)p, the total demand for the branded pharmaceutical is  
(1 ) 1 .l s bb b
b
p
q q
s

   
Figure 1 illustrates the three price regions we have examined above. When the conditions (1.6) hold true, 
the price of the branded pharmaceutical is sufficiently low to attract some (but not all) price-sensitive 
consumers to purchase the branded pharmaceutical. In this situation the branded firm genuinely competes 
for price-sensitive consumers with the generic firms (Set B, Fig. 1). When the price of the branded 
pharmaceutical becomes very low relative to the generic pharmaceutical and pb ≤ (sb/sg)p, all price-
sensitive consumers patronize the branded firm and the firm operates as the monopoly firm in both market 
segments (Set C, Fig. 1). In the other extreme the price of the branded pharmaceutical is so high relative to 
the price of the generic pharmaceuticals (Set A, Fig. 1) that no price-sensitive consumer purchases the 
branded pharmaceutical. Since the branded firm still serves the loyal segment of the market, we can really 
talk about segmented markets in this case.     
Figure 1. Prices of the branded and generic pharmaceuticals and price-sensitive market configurations 
p
pb
pb = (Δ/λ) + p 
pb = (sb/sg)p
Area B: Branded and 
generic firms compete
for price-sensitive
consumers
Area A: Segmented market
outcome
Area C: Branded firm monopoly in 
Both market segments
sg/λ
sb/λ
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The price pairs (pb,p) for which the monopoly profits of either or both firms become negative will be 
ignored in the following analysis. This happens when p ≥ sg/λ or pb ≥ sb/λ or when both of these conditions 
are satisfied. It is not reasonable to think that the equilibrium price of the branded product or generic 
products would belong to either of these regions, since one of the firms always has an incentive to decrease 
the price in order to increase profitability. 
 
 
3.3 Prices of generic pharmaceuticals 
 
Our objective in this section is to derive a symmetric profit-maximizing price for generic pharmaceuticals. 
Because generic firms sell homogeneous products and there are no cost differences between the generic 
firms, the equilibrium price is derived by analysing symmetric Nash equilibrium points in Cournot 
competition between n generic firms. Reagan (2008) uses a similar approach to examine the equilibrium 
prices of generic products. 
The above section showed that different combinations of prices pb and p cause generic firms to face a 
different market environment and aggregate demand. Without loss of generality we can ignore the case 
where generic products face zero aggregate demand, which occurs under the condition pb ≤ (sb/sg)p (Set C 
in Figure 1). There will be no price equilibrium satisfying this condition, since each generic firm has an 
incentive to increase its output, reduce price and capture some share of the price-sensitive market. 
The following Lemma displays the symmetric profit-maximizing price of the generic pharmaceuticals 
for all feasible prices of the branded pharmaceutical. The proof of Lemma can be found in Appendix A1. 
Figure 2 illustrates graphically the price best response described in Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1 The profit-maximizing price of generic pharmaceuticals is given as 
 
 
 
, 0
1
( ) ,
1
, ,
1
g b
b
b
b b b
g b
b
s p
if p L
s n
p p p if L p U
s s
if U p
n

 

 

 
   


 

  
where 
 
( 1)b
b
s n
L
s n



  
and 
 
1
.
1
gs
U
n
 
   
 
  
   
In order to discuss the price best-response function described in Lemma 1 and the associated equilibrium 
points, let us first consider the case in which the price of the branded pharmaceutical satisfies the condition 
pb < L. The best response of generic firms to the price of the branded pharmaceutical is p(pb) = 
(sg/sb)[pb/(n+1)], and the generic firms sell the aggregate output (see the proof of Lemma 1)  
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which is split equally between n generic firms in the market. Given that some price-sensitive consumers are 
informed about the generic products and Φ > 0, the price of the branded pharmaceutical has an impact on 
the prices of generic products (see Lemma 1) and also on the size of the generic market. The higher the 
price of the branded drug, the higher are the profit-maximizing prices of generic pharmaceuticals (prices 
are strategic complements) and the larger is the market share of the generic products (branded and generic 
products are substitutes). 
A second, slightly more surprising finding is that the individual generic firm’s outputs and profits 
decrease as health insurance reimburses higher fractions of pharmaceutical expenditures and the co-
payment gets smaller. This finding contradicts the usual prediction that the smaller the co-payment rate, the 
higher are the prices of pharmaceuticals and the profits of firms in equilibrium. In the current model a 
reduction in the co-payment causes price-sensitive consumers to increase the demand for the high-quality 
branded pharmaceutical. When the co-payment approaches zero (see Eq. (1.7)), all price-sensitive 
consumers purchase the branded pharmaceutical because of the quality advantage. This is the underlying 
reason for the non-standard result. 
Let us then consider equilibrium prices and the outputs of the generic pharmaceuticals, when the 
condition pb > U holds true and the price of the branded pharmaceutical is high relative to the (minimum) 
price of the generic pharmaceuticals. In this case the price of the branded pharmaceutical is so high that no 
price-sensitive consumer considers purchasing the branded product. The branded firm operates as a 
monopoly in the loyal segment of the market and generic firms compete for market shares in the price-
sensitive segment of the market. The equilibrium aggregate output of generic firms is  
2 ( ) ,
1
b
n
Q p
n



(1.14) 
which is divided equally between n generic firms in the market. A feature of the above equilibrium is that 
the price of the branded pharmaceutical has no impact on the prices or outputs of generic firms and 
strategic interaction between the branded and generic firms observed above no longer exists. This reflects 
the fact that when the market is segmented, the branded and generic firms do not compete for the same 
consumers. 
The following figure characterizes the equilibrium prices of generic firms in the market for all feasible 
prices of the branded pharmaceutical.   
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Figure 2. The price best-response function of the generic firms 
 
3.4 Price of the branded pharmaceutical 
 
Having described the best-response function of the generic firms, we are now ready to examine the pricing 
decision of the branded firm. Given symmetric equilibrium of the generic products, the reduced-form profit 
of the branded firm is defined as follows 
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The reduced-form profit (1.15) is defined into two parts. Let us denote the first and the second parts of the 
profit function by v1(pb) and v2(pb) and the unconstrained maximum points of these two functions by pb
1
 
and pb
2
, respectively. The unconstrained maximum point of the first part of the profit function (see proof of 
Lemma 2) is given as  
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The above solution describes the pricing behaviour of the branded firm choosing to compete with generic 
firms for the price-sensitive patients. On the other hand, the monopoly price charged from the loyal 
consumers is the unconstraint maximum point of the second part of the profit function (see proof of Lemma 
2): 
2 .
2
b
b
s
p
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 (1.19) 
The associated maximum profit for the branded firm is 
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A look at the expression (1.17) reveals that F(n,Φ) ≤ 1, which implies that pb
1 
≤ pb
2
, and the branded firm
choosing to compete with generic firms charges a lower price than the monopoly price the firm charged in 
segment markets. Lemma 2, below, describes fully when the branded firm chooses the segmented market 
outcome or competition with generic pharmaceuticals. 
The pharmaceutical market outcome is segmented if the branded firm refrains from price competition 
with generic firms and charges the monopoly price from loyal consumers. The branded firm is better off 
doing so only if the firm’s profit is higher than the profit it obtains by competing for price-sensitive 
consumers with generic firms and charging the price pb
1
. The proof of Lemma 2 demonstrates that the
branded firm chooses the segmented market outcome if the condition 
(2 )g b gn s s s     (1.21) 
is satisfied. 
The condition (1.21) cannot be met if sb ≥ 2sg, because the left-hand side of the equality (1.21) becomes 
negative while the right-hand side is strictly positive. Under this condition the profit-maximizing price of 
the branded pharmaceutical is (1.16). For the market outcome to be segmented, it is necessary that the 
quality difference between the branded and generic drugs is sufficiently small and the different versions of 
the drug are not too differentiated in the minds of patients. A small quality difference implies low profits 
from competition with generic firms and creates an incentive for the branded firm to pursue the segmented 
market outcome, which does not hinge on generic competition. On the other hand, if patients consider the 
branded pharmaceutical to be twice as good (in terms of health effects) as the generic pharmaceuticals, the 
branded firm always obtains a higher profit by competing with generic firms than by charging the 
monopoly price from loyal consumers.  
If sb < 2sg, then it follows from the condition (1.21) that the market outcome is segmented if the policy 
parameter satisfies the condition  
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Since any feasible generic substitution policy must satisfy the condition 0 ≤ Φ, the other condition for the 
segmented market outcome is that the number of generic firms must be higher than (2sg - sb)/Δ. Lemma 2 
describes fully the profit-maximizing pricing behaviour of the branded firm. Figure 3 illustrates graphically 
the segmented market outcome and the situation in which the branded firm engages in price competition 
with generic firms in the market. 
  
Lemma 2 Define the set  
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Then, if sb ≥ 2sg, the profit-maximizing price of the branded firm is pb(n,Φ) = [sb/(2λ)]F(n,Φ) for all 
feasible pairs (n,Φ). If sb < 2sg, the profit-maximizing price of the branded firm is  
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Figure 3. Market outcomes when sb < 2sg. 
The above analysis suggests that the branded firm chooses the segmented market outcome if the number of 
generic firms is large or there are only a few informed price-sensitive consumers in the market. If there are 
many generic firms in the market, the branded firm is better off charging the monopoly price from the loyal 
1
n
Φ
0
Δ/(2sg-sb)
Segmented markets: Branded firm 
charges monopoly price from loyal 
consumers and generic firms compete 
for price-sensitive consumers
Branded firm competes for price-sensitive consumers
with generic firms
SEG(n)
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consumers, since competition with the generic products is not lucrative due to the competitive market 
structure. On the other hand, when the policy has succeeded to inform only a few consumers in the market, 
the loyal segment of the market is large and hence more profitable to the branded firm than the small price-
sensitive market and competition within that market segment.     
3.5 Comparative statics 
The final task of the theoretical section is to provide predictions on the impact of the generic substitution 
policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals. For this we need to characterize the equilibrium prices of the 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals. 
Let us first assume that the branded firm competes for price-sensitive patients with generic firms. The 
branded firm charges the equilibrium price pb(n,Φ) = pb
1
 (see Lemma 2), and because
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our model predicts that increasing the fraction of price-sensitive patients in the market decreases the price 
of the branded pharmaceutical. The equilibrium price of the generic pharmaceuticals in the symmetric 
equilibrium is  
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Again, because 
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we have the prediction that the generic substitution policy decreases the prices of generic pharmaceuticals 
in the market. 
The situation in the case of segmented markets is different (see Lemma 2 for specific conditions). The 
branded firm sets the price pb(n,Φ) = pb
2
 = sb/(2λ), which does not depend on the generic substitution
policy. The equilibrium price of the generic pharmaceuticals is either pi
3
 = pb
2
 – (Δ/λ) = [1/(2λ)](2sg - sb) if
pb
2
 < U, or
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(1.24) 
if pb
2
 ≥ U. In both cases, the equilibrium price of generic pharmaceuticals is not influenced by the
generic substitution policy. The following proposition summarizes the above analysis, and the predictions 
will be tested in the empirical section of this article. 
Proposition 1 Generic substitution policy 
a) decreases the prices of the branded pharmaceutical and generic pharmaceuticals if the branded
firm competes for price-sensitive consumers with generic firms, and
b) has no impact on the prices of the branded pharmaceutical nor the prices of generic
pharmaceuticals if the market outcome is segmented.
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Our model also allows us to contribute to the discussion about the generic paradox (Frank and Salkever, 
1992), which claims that the entry of additional generic firms increases the price of the branded 
pharmaceutical in the market. It should be immediately clear on the basis of Lemma 2 that our model does 
not predict the generic paradox if the branded firm decides to compete for price-sensitive consumers with 
generic firms. Since we have defined that dF/dn < 0, the entry of additional generic firms decreases the 
prices of the branded and generic pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, in the case of the segmented market 
outcome, the branded firm charges the monopoly price to loyal consumers and the equilibrium price is 
independent of the number of generic firms in the market. Therefore, strictly speaking, our model does not 
predict the outcome dpb/dn > 0. However, we do obtain the result that the monopoly price charged in the 
segmented market outcome exceeds the competitive price the branded firm charges when competing for 
price-sensitive consumers with generic firms.  
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Data description and conversions 
Original data (Hokkanen et al. 2012) were provided by the Finnish Medicines Agency (FIMEA). The data 
set includes 51 000 observations of pharmaceutical packages in eleven different ATC (anatomical 
therapeutic chemical classification system) groups at the ATC level 3 (four-digit level): A02B, C07A, 
C08C, C08D, C09A, C09C, C10A, N03A, N05A, N06A and N06D. The original data set contains 
information on the name, strength, size and manufacturer of a packet, number of packages and DDDs sold, 
and the sales of packages in both retail and wholesale prices. Variables in the original data set are listed in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Variables in the original data set and descriptions 
time 1997 – 2007, quarterly 
substitution group identifies a substitution group of a package 
product number unique packet identifier (trade name, packet size, form, DDD quantity) 
package size number of pills or the amount of liquid in a package 
product name trade name 
strength strength of active ingredient 
active substance - 
producer - 
ATC code standard 7-digit ATC-code 
Defined daily dose (DDD) 1000 inhabitant/day, WHO standard 
DDD unit WHO standard 
DDD per package amount of DDD in a packet 
retail sales in thousands (1000 €) - 
whole sales in thousands (1000 €) - 
prescription status dispensed only with prescription 
parallel trade status sold through parallel trade 
Original data span over 44 three-month periods, starting from the first quarter of 1997 and ending at the 
fourth quarter of 2007. The data set is an unbalanced panel due to the entry and exit of pharmaceutical 
products. An aggregation procedure is carried out over the whole data set, but analysis and descriptive 
statistics data start from 2000q1 and the timing of the policy is adjusted to 2002q4 due to the policy 
announcement procedure. We discuss these adjustments in more detail in the section on identification 
strategy and modelling.  
The main variable of interest is the price of a pharmaceutical, which is measured as the price of one 
DDD (defined daily dose) of a pharmaceutical product during a three-month period. A similar definition of 
the unit price has been used widely in the literature on pharmaceutical markets (see e.g. Brekke et al., 2009; 
Pavcnik, 2002; Ellison et al., 1997). The price variable is computed for each package in the original data set 
and deflated with the consumer price index. 
Instead of using package-level information to examine markets, we aggregated information on 
pharmaceutical packages to the level of pharmaceutical products, defined by active ingredients, trade 
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names and manufacturers. For instance, Zocor manufactured by Merck Sharp & Dohme BV is defined as a 
product. The product-level DDD-price is formed by weighting the price of a package by the number of 
packages sold. After aggregation, we have 10 651 product-level observations in the data set, 126 active 
ingredients defined at the ATC level 5 (first seven digits), and 481 unique products. Brand name products 
in the data were identified using information obtained from the Finnish Medicines Agency. Identification 
data was not complete and some additional searches from internet databases had to been done. Our data set 
contains 163 brand name products. 
Outlier observations were excluded from the original data set. All liquid-form drugs, products of 
combined substances, and undefined packet sizes or dosage strengths were excluded as these were not valid 
for aggregation due to different dimensions (for example, a product strength measured in ED-unit). After 
aggregation, all product-level observations with less than one-year appearances in the market were 
excluded. Products can enter and exit the markets only once. Nine active substances in the ATC level 5 
codes (7 digits) were excluded due to their entry after the 26th quarter for not violating the common trend 
assumptions. Exclusions are detailed in Appendix A2. 
Our data set allows natural definitions of the treatment and control groups to be used in the policy 
analysis. The treatment group (GS group) consists of 313 substitutable products, and a product is defined to 
the GS group if it becomes substitutable within any period after the implementation of the generic 
substitution policy in 2003. We define an aggregated product to be substitutable whenever the first package 
of the product becomes substitutable. The Finnish Medicines Agency updates the list of substitutable 
packets quarterly. 
The therapeutic competitors (TC) group contains 205 products that are non-substitutable over the whole 
observation period, but belong to the same level 3 ATC groups (first four digits) with substitutable 
products. Therapeutic classification is needed to control for the possible cross-price effect from the 
treatment group (see Brekke et al., 2009). Active substances in the TC group have been developed to treat 
the same medical conditions as those in the GS group, but pharmaceuticals in the group are not part of the 
GS programme. Defining the TC group with the first four digits of ATC code allows for the fact that, for 
example, different statin substances in C10A may be therapeutic substitutes for each other if their cross-
price elasticities are positive. One reason for being a therapeutic competitor is that no similar strength drug 
exists in the market that generic substitution would require, or that it may be under patent.  
The control group (CG) is formed of those pharmaceuticals that never become substitutable within the 
study period and do not have therapeutic competitors (TC-group drugs) at the ATC code level 3. In 
practice, the control group consists of 11 products in the C08D class in our data set. Outlier modifications 
decrease the number of observations in the control group, leading eventually to complete exclusion of the 
products belonging to the C07F group. The N03A group contains non-substitutable products, but those are 
heavily exposed to therapeutic competition and were therefore not included in the control group. 
We defined a pharmaceutical market to consist of products belonging to the same at ATC level 5 -
group, which refers to the active ingredient level. There is some empirical evidence supporting the 
argument that different active ingredients may belong to the same market (see (Brekke et al., 2009; Ellison 
et al. 1997) and that therapeutic competition exists. According to our definition, competition takes place 
among products in the same ATC level 5 for the following reasons. Firstly, we are not able to identify when 
products with different active ingredients would be competitors – it depends greatly on a patient’s diagnosis 
and proposed treatments by physicians. Secondly, generic substitution policy takes place at pharmacies, 
where products compete at the ATC level 5 or even at a more refined level in practice. Therefore, a 
somewhat narrower definition of a market is justified. 
Table 2 sums up the descriptive statistics before, after and overall on aggregated data according to the 
main groups defined earlier. Before and after figures indicate that, on average, GS-group drug prices 
decreased after the generic substitution policy was implemented. Control-group prices remained quite 
stable. Therapeutic competitors raised their prices on average within the study period. 
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Table 2. Product-level regressed DDD real prices (xEUR 1000) over main groups. 
Before generic substitution policy (2000q1 – 2002q3) 
Obs. Mean robust S.E.  95% CI 
GS group 1105 0.00665 0.0000175 .0066189 .0066875 
TC group 1158 0.00689 0.0000103 .0068692 .0069096 
Control group 110 0.00364 0.0000074 .0036287 .0036579 
After generic substitution policy (2002q4 – 2007q4) 
GS group 4060 0.00452 0.0000189 .0044794 .0045535 
TC group 1738 0.00893 0.0000619 .0088093 .0090523 
Control group 182 0.00336 0.0000342 .0032953 .0034305 
Over the study period (2000q1 – 2007q4) 
GS group 5165 0.00497 0.0000189 .0049365 .0050107 
TC group 2896 0.00811 0.0000452 .008026 .0082031 
Control group 292 0.00347 0.0000347 .0034137 .0035233 
4.2 Identification strategy and modelling 
Our main objective is to estimate the average treatment effects (ATEs) of the generic substitution policy by 
applying a differences-in-differences setup. Applied pharmaceutical policy in Finland provides us with an 
environment that can be analysed in a quasi-natural experimental framework (Angrist and Lavy 1999, 
2002). Gradual implementation of the generic substitution and reference pricing policies ensures that no 
previous policies or regulation, except the price cap regulation, affects the outcome. Price regulation should 
not affect price competition; it only defines a maximum wholesale price of pharmaceuticals through 
negotiation with the FPPB. This provides us a setup where the price effects of the GS policy can be 
estimated. 
Traditionally difference-in-differences estimation is built on the following key assumptions for ATE-
interpretation: i) the populations of interest have common trends in pre-policy periods and ii) selection does 
not affect populations in the treatment and control groups (Blundell and Costa-Dias 2009). 
Figure 4a displays the average prices in the main groups of interest both before and after the 
implementation of the policy. The vertical dashed x-line in both figures 4a and 4b point to the time of 
introducing the policy in the 2
nd
 quarter of 2003. The solid x-line in the figures refers to the announcement
of the government proposal in the fourth quarter of 2002 (HE 165/2002) for applying generic substitution. 
We assume that the policy began to influence firms’ pricing behaviour already at the time the government 
proposal was announced and therefore define the intervention as beginning in the fourth quarter of 2002. 
 Figure 4a reveals that no discernible differences in the price trends between treatment, control and 
therapeutic groups exist in the pre-policy period. In Figure 4b additional logarithmic DDD-prices of 
substitutable generics and substitutable brand name products are displayed, which refines our estimation 
strategy and allows the separate estimation of the policy on prices for branded products.  
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4a Main drug groups                                                                 4b substitutable and brand-name drugs subject to policy 
 
Figure 4. Average prices before and after the implementation of the generic substitution (GS) policy. 
 
We test the validity of the common-trends assumption by estimating the price trends for the treatment and 
control groups over the pre-policy periods from the first quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2002. 
Results are displayed in Table 3. The logarithmic DDD-price was regressed for all products and the 
branded products in the treatment group on interaction with the GS group, time trend, therapeutic 
competition dummy variable, number of generic firms and product-level fixed effects. This modelling 
follows the strategy of an actual policy effects estimation. 
Standard errors are clustered at the active substance level (ATC Level 5) yielding us 109 clusters for 
estimations. We assume the product prices correlated within active ingredient levels. Due to the applied 
policy, we do not take into consideration the dependencies between therapeutic substitutes (4-digit code, 
ATC Level 3), even if this might exist (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Pavcnik 2002). With product-level 
clustering we would neglect the possibility of a correlation between products that are produced from an 
identical active ingredient. Pre-treatment trends were not valid when the test period was pro-longed to the 
first quarter of 2003, i.e. to the time of actual intervention 
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Table 3. Pre-treatment trend test 2000q1 – 2002q3 
Interaction groups in model 
substitutable drugs brand x substitutable 
Interaction 2000q1 0.000264 0.00360 
(0.00300) (0.0130) 
Interaction 2000q2 - 0.00694 
(0.0111) 
Interaction 2000q3 0.00129 0.00469 
(0.00281) (0.0107) 
Interaction 2000q4 -0.00372 0.0102 
(0.00451) (0.00970) 
Interaction 2001q1 -0.0122* 0.0218* 
(0.00698) (0.0117) 
Interaction 2001q2 -0.00872 0.00770 
(0.0111) (0.00886) 
Interaction 2001q3 -0.0180 0.00494 
(0.0119) (0.00952) 
Interaction 2001q4 -0.0211* 0.00770 
(0.0109) (0.00843) 
Interaction 2002q1 -0.0300** 0.0100 
(0.0146) (0.00968) 
Interaction 2002q2 -0.0319** 0.00864 
(0.0140) (0.00934) 
Interaction 2002q3 -0.0326** 0.00371 
(0.0147) (0.00926) 
Joint significance of interactions (prob > F) 0.1753 0.2486 
F-stat. F(10, 108) = 1.43 F(11, 108) = 1.27 
Therapeutic - 
Number of generic firms in market -0.000817
(0.00223) 
Fixed effects Yes 
Time-dummies Yes 
Observations 2,373 
Number of products 245 
R-squared 0.130 
F-test 66.91*** 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The data for the study are based on the most common diagnoses and the largest drugs classes where generic 
substitution occurs. The chosen ATC classes cover 23.5 per cent of all reimbursed pharmaceutical 
expenditures. Based on the above test results on common pre-policy trends, the ATE-interpretation of the 
policy effects is internally valid for the included drug groups. As for external validity, however, we cannot 
argue that the estimated policy effects would apply to all substitutable products on average. We merely 
assume that the resulting estimates represent upper bounds for the policy effects due to the use of the most 
common ATC groups exposed to the GS policy. We expect that smaller ATC-groups would imply smaller 
markets but also smaller policy effects. 
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The control group has to meet the requirements of parallel trends and similarity in observables, but it 
must not be affected (contaminated) by the applied GS policy. Data contain several ATC groups that are 
not subject to policy and the active substances are similar in the observables to the treatment group. 
Forming a control group of all the ATC groups that meet this criterion would in principle provide a good 
control group. The downside of using such a control group is that it may generate a bias through therapeutic 
competition (Pavcnik 2002; Brekke 2009). Excluding the therapeutic substitutes with an ATC 4-digit code 
(ATC Level 3) leaves us with a control group that consists of C08D-class pharmaceuticals only. Such a 
control group avoids selection bias with the treatment group. The exclusion decision is made on the basis of 
medical treatment safety for the selected groups. Drugs in C08D are mainly used to treat arrhythmia, and 
the Finnish Medicines Agency excluded those pharmaceuticals from the substitution program (Hartikainen-
Herranen and Paldán 2005). 
Restricting the control group may raise the question of whether the defined control group provides a 
good reference for all ATC-groups subject to the policy. It may apply better to C-group drugs, but they are 
less similar to ATC A- or N-group drugs. This links back to the feature discussed above: the control group 
formed from the most similar in observables observations -rule is not plausible without generating a 
therapeutic bias into estimates.  
We can evaluate the plausibility of the actual control group (CG) with a therapeutic group (TC) in pre-
policy periods. The TC group does not differ from the control or treatment groups before the GS policy is 
applied and it includes the same active ingredients as the treatment group by definition. Pre-treatment tests 
are not jointly significant for therapeutics (Prob > F = 0.5610) when regressed with a substitutable and 
control group. We argue that the TC group can be seen as a second control group in the pre-policy period 
with more observations, while the actual control group (CG) does not differ from other groups. Our 
understanding is that therapeutic bias in control group prices is a more severe problem for the ATE 
estimation than the less valid control over all pharmaceuticals. 
The number of firms in the control group declines from six in the first period to four in the 27
th
 period 
and remains unchanged for the remaining study periods. These changes do not have severe impacts on 
DDD-prices in the control group (see Figure 4). However, regulatory changes in maximum prices can 
change prices exogenously: for instance, an FPPB-applied price reduction (via a renewed sales permit) for 
C08D products in the 4
th
 quarter of 2004, which can be observed and controlled in our data. In addition, an 
FPPB decreased the maximum accepted wholesale price by 5 per cent in 2006 for all prescription products 
(government proposal 97/2005). This does not require additional measures, as all products were affected. 
If we have reason to assume that policy effects adjust or change over time, a multi-period extension of 
the two-period DID-model offers more insight into price variations over time (Wolfers 2006; Wooldridge 
and Imbens 2009). On the basis of Figure 4 such price variation is evident. It took some time for the price 
effect to adjust after the policy was implemented. A long-term price adjustment is also emphasized by 
Granlund (2010) in his study on the effects of the generic substitution policy. 
With the above arguments we assume causality from the generic substitution policy to prices in models 
without controls for market structure. Controlling the market structure may also create a problem of bad 
controls if the market structure itself is influenced by the policy (Angrist and Pischke 2009). We estimate 
the models with and without market structure and evaluate the difference between the obtained estimates. 
 
 
4.3 Econometric models 
 
Econometric modelling is done in two steps. We first estimate a standard DID-model where the 
differences in the mean outcomes between the treatment and control groups are compared after and before 
the government announcement of the forthcoming policy. We then extend the standard setup to a multi-
period model, which allows an estimation of the policy effects over time. In both steps, we also include the 
number of generic firms into the analysis in order to control for any effects that market structure might 
have on the prices of pharmaceuticals. Although we acknowledge that market structure may be 
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endogenously determined, we proceed with the OLS-estimation with no aim to give a causal interpretation 
for the parameter estimate associated with the number of generic firms.  
Equation 2.1 below displays the baseline econometric model. The model is similar to Brekke et al. 
(2009) or Pavcnik (2002). The dummy variable GS identifies those products that were subject to generic 
substitution at some quarter after the government proposal in October 2002. The policy was applied in 
April 2003 for pharmacies and became observable to consumers. The reason for the adjustment is that firms 
may respond to the announcement of a forthcoming policy and pre-trend tests support this adjustment. The 
parameter β1 estimates the average price effect of the GS policy for all substitutable pharmaceuticals, and 
the parameter β1+β2 for the substitutable brand-name products (BRAND-variable identifies brand name 
products). The dummy variable TC controls for therapeutic competitors and the interaction BRAND×TC 
brand-name products in TC price effects in the post-policy period. Therapeutic competitor is defined at the 
same ATC level 3 with substitutable products but TC’s never are substitutable. The variable NoFgmt 
measures the number of generic firms in the market m at time period t. This variable was introduced to 
control the effect of market structure on the prices of pharmaceuticals. We define a pharmaceutical market 
as including all products with the same active ingredient. The product-level fixed effects were included as 
controls of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity over different products. Time dummies τt were 
introduced to control time trends, interaction τt ×ATC 3-digit controls state-specific trends for robustness 
and εit is the error term.  
1 2 3 4 5ln it i i i i i i mt t i itp GS BRAND GS TC BRAND TC NoFg                 (2.1) 
We then utilize a multi-period extension of the model (2.1) following the ideas presented by Wolfers 
(2006) and applied earlier to Finnish data by Hokkanen et al. (2012). Compared to two-period DID-
estimation (see e.g. Wolfers 2006; Wooldridge and Imbens 2009), the division of the post-policy period 
into sub-periods allows us to explore the effects of the policy over time. The multi-period model is 
formalized as follows:    
ititmtiiiiijjjijjjit NoFgTCBRANDTCBRANDGSGSp    3211
7
10
7
1ln (2.2) 
In the above model (2.2), the variable GSij is a dummy variable obtaining value 1 if product i is subject to 
generic substitution for j sub-periods after the government proposal of the policy. Products with the highest 
values of GSij belong to the generic substitution programme from the beginning of the program until the 
end of the study period (see Hokkanen et al., 2012). 
The post-policy periods, quarters 24–44 (2002, 3rd quarter – 2007, 4
th
 quarter), are divided into seven
sub-periods. The first sub-period after the generic substitution proposal (ie. j = 1) refers to the two quarters 
24–25 and the second sub-period to quarters 26–28 (ie. j = 2), emphasizing that the substitution policy is 
active from the 26
th
 quarter onwards. The third sub-period refers to quarters 29–31, the fourth to quarters
32–34 and so on until the seventh sub-period refers to the last quarters 41–44 in our data. The multi-period 
model allows us to estimate the average price change caused by the GS policy separately for each sub-
period and for both generic and branded products.  
In the multi-period model 2), the parameter θ0j estimates the effects of the policy for generic products in 
the group of substitutable products in the sub-period j=1,2,…7, and the sum θ0j+θ1j measures the policy 
effects for substitutable brand-name products. Policy effects are estimated for seven separate time periods 
after the implementation of the policy. The control variables are otherwise the same as in the first model. 
The propositions for pricing behaviour derived in the theoretical section are tested with models (2.1) 
and (2.2) described above. Our theoretical model predicts that the GS policy leads to price reductions for 
both generics and branded drugs if no segmentation occurs. On the other hand, if market segmentation 
takes place, the policy is ineffective for branded firms. Generic firms compete in price with each other, and 
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the brand names refrains from price competition. This can take place if the policy aiming to inform patients 
about the existence of generic products does not reach many patients or if generic competition is fierce. 
 
 
4.4 Empirical results 
 
We first estimate four variants of the standard model, which refers to two-period differences in differences 
(DID). The estimation strategy follows that outlined by Brekke et al. (2009). Results and model variations 
are displayed in Table 4.1. The estimate of the standard DID-parameter β1 -0.323 (model 1 in Table 4) 
implies an average 28 per cent price reduction (Log – level conversion) for substitutable drugs after the 
announcement of the proposal. The estimated coefficients remain stable after adding control variables to 
the baseline model and the results remain the same qualitatively for all models. The price effects of the 
policy for the substitutable branded products differ from the average generic price effects (model 2 and 
model 3 results in Table 4) as branded prices decrease less than generics. 
Including therapeutic controls decreases the substitution effect and the results are in line with the 
predictions of the segmented markets model (see Section 3), as tested coefficients β1+β2 are zero for 
substitutable brand-name products. Therapeutic brand-name products also have a separate and significant 
positive effect in the group of therapeutic competitors (model 3 results in Table 4). The therapeutic group 
consist of non-substitutable and new products that may be under patent. These reasons can drive increasing 
prices in the therapeutic group. 
Full model results are displayed in the model 4 column, with an exogenous number of generic firms. 
The generic products price effect due to policy is -23%, whereas the substitutable brand names combined 
price effect is close to zero and not significant. In other words, brand names do not respond to applied 
policy. The effect of the number of generic firms is significant and negative. However, the number of firms 
has an effect mainly on generic prices, but we underline that this is not a real market structure effect.  State-
specific trend results are displayed in the model 5 -column for a robustness check. These support other 
results on the segmented outcome of prices due to the applied policy. The state-specific trends specification 
(model 5) results are close to model 4 as they can include the market structure effect within it.  
  
4. Empirical analysis
THL — Discussion paper 3/2015 28 
Long-run effects of the generic 
substitution policy on prices of branded 
and generic pharmaceuticals 
Table 4. Price effects for generic substitution 
model(1) model(2) model(3) model(4) model(5) 
with state x time 
VARIABLES ln price/DDD ln price/DDD ln price/DDD ln price/DDD ln price/DDD 
Substitutable drugs -0.323*** -0.480*** -0.340*** -0.259*** -0.263***
(0.0679) (0.104) (0.0947) (0.0885) (0.0720) 
Brand x Substitutable 0.281*** 0.289*** 0.279*** 0.268*** 
(0.0884) (0.0887) (0.0844) (0.0786) 
Therapeutic 0.0254 0.0286 0.0276 
(0.0376) (0.0378) (0.0523) 
Brand x Therapeutic 0.160*** 0.152*** 0.157*** 
(0.0478) (0.0458) (0.0475) 
Number of generic firms in 
the market 
-0.0609***
(0.0160) 
Observations 8,353 8,353 8,353 8,353 8,353 
R-squared 0.367 0.383 0.386 0.424 0.493 
Number of product id 444 444 444 444 444 
FPPB Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 8.81*** 8.96*** NA NA NA 
 Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The estimation results of the multi-period extensions (model 2.2) are displayed in Table 5. The first 
period’s price effect is tested zero and significant price reductions occur in the last six periods. The fact the 
first period is not significant for both types, generics and brand names, is due to the applied policy that 
becomes active in pharmacies after the 2
nd
 quarter of 2003 (quarters 26–28). 
Adding the number of firms to the model shows (model 7 in Table 5) that, as generally assumed, the 
increasing number of firms has a significant and negative impact on prices and the main effect does not 
depend on the model specification. However, by adding the number of firms into the model, we assume 
that the number of generic firms is exogenously determined. Adding the number of generic firms so as to 
control for the market structure shifts some of the effect from the policy’s price reduction. For all 
substitutable drugs, the first and second period estimates are insignificant, while substitutable branded 
drugs in the first three periods yields a tested zero effect. Long-term effects for both types yield price 
reductions in the substitutable group, being notably greater for generics than for brand-names. This 
supports the theoretical prediction for proposition 1 in the standard case, where markets do not segment. 
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Table 5. Price effects for generic substitution in multi-period estimations 
   model (6) model (7) 
No. of generic 
firms 
model (8)  
with state x time 
model (9) 
with state x time and No. 
of generic firms  
 
VARIABLES ln price/DDD ln price/DDD ln price/DDD ln price/DDD 
     
Substitutable drugs (24-25 quarters) 0.000654 0.0456 0.0595 0.0766 
 (0.0924) (0.0824) (0.0556) (0.0570) 
Substitutable drugs (26-28 quarters) -0.224** -0.142 -0.132** -0.0774 
 (0.102) (0.0948) (0.0557) (0.0631) 
Substitutable drugs (29-31 quarters) -0.443*** -0.348*** -0.330*** -0.258*** 
 (0.105) (0.0986) (0.0638) (0.0725) 
Substitutable drugs (32-34 quarters) -0.640*** -0.546*** -0.510*** -0.437*** 
 (0.116) (0.108) (0.0779) (0.0842) 
Substitutable drugs (35-37 quarters) -0.719*** -0.633*** -0.578*** -0.510*** 
 (0.120) (0.113) (0.0892) (0.0947) 
Substitutable drugs (38-40 quarters) -0.764*** -0.686*** -0.616*** -0.551*** 
 (0.143) (0.136) (0.117) (0.121) 
Substitutable drugs (41-44 quarters) -0.844*** -0.775*** -0.721*** -0.653*** 
 (0.172) (0.165) (0.147) (0.148) 
Brand x Substitutable (24-25 quarters) -0.0114 -0.0322 -0.0346 -0.0489 
 (0.0697) (0.0645) (0.0523) (0.0501) 
Brand x Substitutable (26-28 quarters) 0.162* 0.117 0.138** 0.0964 
 (0.0902) (0.0874) (0.0676) (0.0696) 
Brand x Substitutable (29-31 quarters) 0.316*** 0.284*** 0.285*** 0.253*** 
 (0.102) (0.0972) (0.0888) (0.0881) 
Brand x Substitutable (32-34 quarters) 0.401*** 0.387*** 0.360*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0927) (0.0907) (0.0894) 
Brand x Substitutable (35-37 quarters) 0.414*** 0.428*** 0.374*** 0.388*** 
 (0.0973) (0.0945) (0.0956) (0.0938) 
Brand x Substitutable (38-40 quarters) 0.386*** 0.424*** 0.357*** 0.396*** 
 (0.129) (0.127) (0.122) (0.120) 
Brand x Substitutable (41-44 quarters) 0.375** 0.427*** 0.354** 0.408*** 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.138) (0.137) 
Therapeutic x policy -0.0338 -0.0263 -0.0141 -0.0128 
   (0.0289) (0.0304) (0.0406) (0.0435) 
Brand x Therapeutic x policy 0.0672* 0.0665* 0.0842** 0.0747** 
 (0.0346) (0.0343) (0.0398) (0.0367) 
Number of generic firms in market  -0.0527***  -0.0530*** 
  (0.0150)  (0.0144) 
Observations 8,353 8,353 8,353 8,353 
R-squared 0.491 0.518 0.562 0.585 
Number of product id 444 444 444 444 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State x time No No Yes Yes 
FPPB Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test NA NA NA NA 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Percentage changes of prices are displayed in Table 6. Standard DID results are converted from the model 
3 (Table 4) specification and with the state x time trend from model 5. The generic price reduction varies 
from -23 to -29 per cent between specifications. The average policy effect may be underestimated in model 
2.1 if the long-run effect on prices is 51 to 57 per cent lower after the government proposal. Long-run 
coefficients are log-level converted from multi-period specifications model 6 and model 8 in Table 5. 
Brand names have a tested zero average effect in the standard DID models but as emphasized earlier, 
results are refined in the multi-period estimation. Results for brand name price effects are from the same 
specification as for the generics above. Significant and tested price reductions occur from the second to 
seventh periods, quarters 26–44. Including the state x time trend yields a tested zero effect for brand names 
in quarters 24–31 and from 32 onwards the effect is negative and significant. No specification yielded a 
greater price reduction for brand names over generics. 
Table 6. Policy effect on branded and generic prices in per cent 
Generics Brand-name 
state x time trend No Yes No Yes 
Standard DID models -29 %*** -23 %*** 0 % 0 % 
multi-period models 
24–25 quarters 0 % 6 % -1 % 3 % 
26–28 quarters -20 %** -12 %** -6 %* 1 % 
29–31 quarters -36 %*** -28 %*** -12 %*** -4 %
32–34 quarters -47 %*** -40 %*** -21 %*** -14 %***
35–37 quarters -51 %*** -44 %*** -26 %*** -18 %***
38–40 quarters -53 %*** -46 %*** -31 %*** -23 %***
41–44 quarters -57 %*** -51 %*** -37 %*** -31 %***
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5. Discussion
According to our results, brand name drugs do not respond to increased generic competition in standard 
two-period DID modelling in our data at first glance. Model 2, where the therapeutic effect is excluded, 
shows decreasing prices for both brand name and generics, but as stated earlier, the therapeutic effect can 
bias the results. Estimates with the therapeutic group provided falling prices for substitutable generics and 
only a minor reduction for substitutable brand names. In coefficient tests for model 3, the brand name-
effect was not statistically significant. An exogenous interpretation for the market structure decreases the 
price effects of policy.  
The long-run effect estimation with several post-policy periods refines the standard modelling results. 
For a post-policy period of almost five years, it is useful to study the price effect changes over time. Long-
term effects in our study confirm that both prices do decline, but that the brand-name price reductions are 
notably smaller than for generics due to the applied generic substitution policy. The eventual price 
reduction can be very different depending on the modelling strategy, as the generic prices fall between 51–
57 per cent and the brand names fall 31–37 per cent according to the multi-period estimates. The gap to our 
standard model results is close to 30 per cent. It is rational to assume that standard modelling cannot 
capture the effect as accurately as estimating several post-policy periods does. Long-run effects are in line 
with the theoretical prediction of the standard case in proposition 1. The results remain robust and 
qualitatively the same for all model variants. Our results accord with the study by Aalto-Setälä (2008), 
where generics and brand-name products have different price effects in the Finnish data. 
A limitation regarding our results is that we estimate an upper boundary for the policy effect because 
our sample consists of the highest selling pharmaceuticals, which here consists of 23 per cent of all 
reimbursable drugs in Finland.  For DID-identification the validity of our control group may raise concerns 
as it consists of the ATC class of C08D drugs only. We showed earlier in the identification section that the 
control group fulfils the common trends requirements with and without therapeutic substitutes in the pre-
policy period. An improvement would be to estimate the policy effect with an increase in all 
pharmaceuticals. Depending on the model variation, the brand name price reduction comes with a long lag 
time, which may indicate that some unobserved feature can push prices downwards, other than the policy 
itself, i.e. endogenous market structure effects, which we cannot control. The methods used by Regan 
(2008) would be most applicable, but we had doubts about the exclusion restriction with our data, as no 
instrument at hand would fulfil the requirements at this point. Endogeneity issues remain to be solved in 
future studies. 
A lack of IPR data in our estimations is also a limitation, but we assume this should not affect our 
results because substitutable products cannot have monopoly-status in the markets if generic competition 
occurs in the Finnish system. An external reference pricing system, based on other countries basket price-
references are used for innovative and in-patent drugs when other domestic references for acceptable 
wholesale prices do not exist. In an EU commission study (2013), ten countries were reported as applying 
external reference pricing, as supportive criterion for in-patent (or innovative) drugs in Belgium, Finland, 
Italy, Poland, Spain and Germany and more binding for Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Norway, and Portugal. External reference pricing via a basket system may sustain high brand-name prices 
in smaller markets if competition does not occur in bigger countries within the same basket. A firm’s profit 
can be positive even though they might be losing smaller markets by keeping brand name prices high. 
Decreasing price in one country may force a lower product price in every country within the same basket. 
Generic substitution and reference price systems are known to decrease prices (Galizzi et al. 2011) but 
studies on the long-run effect are rare. To our knowledge, Granlund (2010) is the only study that provides a 
reference to our setup of a generic substitution study with a long-run perspective. Granlund’s (2010) 
empirical results suggest that prices went down by 10% on average in long-run effects of Sweden GS after 
the policy implementation. Substitutable brand name prices decreased  by 16% whereas substitutable 
generics decreased by 9%. Long-run estimates yielded a greater price effect in Granlund’s (2010) study.  
5. Discussion
THL — Discussion paper 3/2015 32 
Long-run effects of the generic 
substitution policy on prices of branded 
and generic pharmaceuticals 
Our results differ from Granlund’s (2010) results. We observed also falling prices, but the substitutable 
generics prices decrease heavily compared to substitutable brand name drugs. Different results may arise 
from differences in data classification strategy compared to our study, in terms of therapeutic bias, as 
mentioned in the identification section. Another important driver can be the underlying policy environment 
in Sweden. From 1993 to September 2002 Sweden had applied a reference price system, which was 
changed to a generic substitution system in October 2002.  
Mixed results can also occur with applied reference price systems: Brekke et al. (2009; 2011) have 
studied the effect of reference price system in Norway, and Pavcnik (2002) in Germany respectively. Both 
studies show that reference pricing decreases the prices of pharmaceuticals but brand-names prices 
decrease more than generics. Kaiser et al. (2014) studied a change from an external to an internal reference 
price in Denmark. Their results differ from the results of Brekke (2009; 2011) and Pavcnik (2002), as the 
change in the Danish systems yields greater price reductions for generics and a minor negative effect for 
brand names.  
The market environments are comparable among Nordic countries as they all apply a very similar form 
of regulation.  We use the studies of Brekke et al. (2009; 2011), Granlund (2010) and Kaiser et al. (2014) as 
the main references due to their similar methodology to ours. We acknowledge the institutional differences 
between generic substitution and reference prices, but from a broader perspective, comparisons can be 
made. Both types of policies should yield cost containment, which they do, but the outcomes seem to be 
different. This underlines the importance of policy design being applied, which obviously plays an 
important role in market outcomes. The existing literature provides evidence that in applying a reference 
pricing system, it is a common outcome for brand name drugs to decrease in price more than generics 
(Merino – Castello 2003; Miraldo 2009). This can be due to the fact that the reference price system creates 
different incentives for price competition compared to generic substitution, as the behaviour of firms in a 
reference price system can be endogenous (Miraldo 2009; Merino-Castello 2003). Reference pricing is 
commonly linked with previous-period-observed prices and a profit maximizing firm may not have an 
incentive to decrease drug prices as low as they would without the RP system.  
Incentives as defined by Miraldo (2009) may explain the observed outcomes of applied reference price 
systems in Brekke et al. (2009; 2011) if generics do not have an incentive for decreased prices as much as 
brand names. Kaiser et al.’s (2014) study provides contradictory results, but our interpretation is that a 
switch from an external to internal RP system creates similar incentives to enhance price competition as 
seen with GS, even though the policies are design-specific. Moreover, Kaiser et al.’s (2014) data cover only 
statin-class pharmaceuticals, which may limit the comparability or their results to ours. 
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6. Concluding remarks
The purpose of our study was to utilize the applied Finnish GS policy as a natural experiment and estimate 
the outcomes of policy on branded and generic drug prices. We contribute to existing studies with long-
term effect estimates and refined the setup with several post-policy estimates for price effects. 
In this study we derived a theoretical model for an applied generic substitution policy as a mean of 
increasing consumer’s information about alternative products. Predictions show that we can end up with a 
standard regime of competition between brand-name and generics or under certain conditions, we can end 
up with a segmented regime where competition does not occur between generics and brand name 
pharmaceuticals.  
In the empirical section we estimated the applied generic substitution policy price effects with the 
Finnish data set. The empirical results eventually support the standard markets regime, where competition 
occurs in long-term estimates in multi-period modelling. The two-period modelling results lend support to a 
segmented market result in terms of zero effect, but the results are not robust when compared to the refined 
model estimates. 
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Appendix A1 
Proof of Lemma 1 Let us first consider pairs of prices (p,pb) in the set 
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For such prices both the branded firm and generic firms compete for price-sensitive patients. Hence the 
profit function of generic firm i = 1,2,…,n is defined as follows: 
1 1( ) ,
g
i i b i
b
s
p c q F p Q q F
s


   
          (3.2) 
where 
1
.
n
i
i
Q q

 Let q1 = (q11,q12,…,q1n) denote interior Nash equilibrium outputs. Equilibrium outputs
must satisfy the system of first-order conditions: 
 
1
0
gi
b i
i b
s
p Q q
q s


  
      
(3.3) 
for i = 1,2,…,n. Second-order conditions are satisfied in an interior equilibrium, because the profit function 
(3.2)  is a strictly concave function in output qi for all i = 1,2,…,n. Summing up the first-order conditions 
(3.3) gives an equality 
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which can be solved with respect to the aggregate supply of generic pharmaceuticals 
1 1( ) .
1
b
b
pn
Q Q p
n

 
 
(3.5) 
The equilibrium price of generic pharmaceuticals is 
1 1( )
1
g b
i b
b
s p
p p p
s n
 

(3.6) 
          Appendix
THL — Discussion paper 3/2015 35 
Long-run effects of the generic 
substitution policy on prices of branded 
and generic pharmaceuticals 
for all i = 1,2,….,n. The Nash equilibrium is symmetric and generic firm i produces the n
th
 fraction of the
aggregate equilibrium output 
1 ( )( ) .
1
b b
i b
Q p p
q p
n n

 
 
(3.7) 
Equilibrium profit of generic firm i is 
2
1 1( ) .
1
g b
i i b
b
s p
p F
s n

 
 
    
  
(3.8) 
The equilibrium is an interior solution if p
1
(pb) > pb – (Δ/λ) or
( 1)
.bb
b
s n
p L
s n
 
  
  
(3.9) 
Let us then consider price pairs (p,pb) in the set 
2
2 ( , ) ,0 .
gb
b b
ss
S p p R p p p
  

  
       
  
(3.10) 
The profit function of generic firm i = 1,2,…,n is now defined as 
2 2 1 ,
g
i i i
s Q
p q F q F

 
     
 
(3.11) 
where 
1
.
n
i
i
Q q

 Let q2 = (q21,q22,…,q2n) denote interior Nash equilibrium outputs. The system of first-
order conditions is 
2
1 0
gi i
i
s qQ
q


  
    
   
(3.12) 
for i = 1,2,…,n. Using the same techniques as above, we can solve for equilibrium aggregate output of 
generic firms 
2 ( ) ,
1
b
n
Q p
n



(3.13) 
          Appendix
THL — Discussion paper 3/2015 36 
Long-run effects of the generic 
substitution policy on prices of branded 
and generic pharmaceuticals 
equilibrium prices of generic firms 
2 2 1( )
1
g
i b
s
p p p
n
 

(3.14) 
and firm outputs 
2 2 ( )
1
i bq q p
n

 

  (3.15) 
for all i = 1,2,…,n. The equilibrium profit of firm i is 
2
2 1 .
1
g
i
s
F
n


 
   
 
(3.16) 
The above equilibrium is an interior solution if p
2
(pb) < pb – (Δ/λ) or when
1
U.
1
g
b
s
p
n
 
    
 
(3.17) 
Now it is straightforward to demonstrate by direct computation that L < U. This suggests that the 
characterization of the best response of the generic pharmaceuticals is not yet complete and we need to find 
the price best response of generic firms for prices pb in the interval [L,U].   
Our final task is to show that if the price of the branded pharmaceutical satisfies the conditions L ≤ pb ≤ U, 
no generic firm has an incentive to deviate from the symmetric equilibrium in which each generic firm 
charges a price p
3
(pb) = pb – (Δ/λ), the generic industry output is
3( ) bb b
g
s
Q p p
s


  
  
 
(3.18) 
and each firm produces output 
b
i b
g
s
q q p
ns


  
   
 
(3.19) 
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To check that no generic firm wants to deviate from output q, assume that all other firms than firm i 
produce q. Then the profit of firm i is 
  
3
1 ,
( 1)
1 , .
g
b i i i
b
i
g i
i i
s
p q n q q F if q q
s
s q n q
q F if q q



  
     
 
 
            
(3.20) 
Both parts of the firm i′s profit are strictly concave functions in qi with unique maximum points. The first 
part of the firm i's profit has its unconstrained maximum point at 
1 1( ) ( 1) ,
2
i bq q p n q
   
      
(3.21) 
and the second part obtains its unconstrained maximum at the point 
 2
1
( ) ( 1) .
2
iq q n q   (3.22) 
It is now possible to show that that qi
2
(q) ≤ q , if and only if pb ≤ U, and that qi
1
(q) ≥ q, if and only if, pb ≥
L. These two observations and the strict concavity of the firm i’s profit function implies that the profit i is
maximized at qi = q, and firm i has no incentive to deviate from the output q. Since the same argument 
holds for all generic firms in the market, firm outputs q
3
 = (q,q,….,q), the aggregate output Q³(pb) and price
p³(pb) form an equilibrium. || 
Proof of Lemma 2 Given p(pb), the reduced-form profit of the branded firm is defined as follows 
 
(1 ) 1 1 ,
( 1)
1 1 ,
b b b
b b
b b
b
b
b b
b
p p s n
p if p L
s s n
p
p if p L
s
 


     
        
      
 
 
   
 
(3.23) 
Let the functions
4
 v1(pb) and v2(pb) denote the first and the second parts of the profit function (3.23),
respectively. Both functions are continuous in their relevant domains. Moreover, because the branded firm 
4 To simplify the notation, we do not introduce arguments n and Φ into the functions v1(.) and v2(.). 
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loses all price-sensitive consumers, when pb ≥ L, it holds true that v1(L) = v2(L), and the profit function 
(1.15) is a continuous function for all non-negative prices. 
Let us denote unconstrained maximum points of the first and the second parts the functions v1(.) and v2(.) 
by pb
1
 and pb
2
. It is straightforward to demonstrate that both functions are strictly concave functions in pb,
which implies that the unconstrained maximum points are unique and can be found by analysing the 
respective first-order conditions. 
The first-order condition of the first part of the profit function is given as follows: 
 
 
1( ) 1 1 1
1
b b b b
b b b
v p p p s n
p s s n
     
              
1
0,
( 1)
b
b
b b
s n
p
s s n

    
   
   
(3.24) 
which can be solved with respect to the unconstrained maximum point 
1 ( , ),
2
b
b
s
p F n

  (3.25) 
where 
g
( 1)
( , ) .
( 1) s n
n
F n
n
 
 
  
(3.26) 
The second first-order condition 
   2
( ) 1
1 2 0b b b
b b
v p
s p
p s


   

(3.27) 
can be solved with respect to the unconstraint maximum point 
2 ,
2
b
b
s
p

 (3.28) 
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Appendix
It is immediately clear that pb
1 
≤ pb
2
 because F(n,Φ) ≤ 1 for any pair (n,Φ). It is also worthwhile to observe 
that F(0,Φ) = 1 for any feasible policy and F(n,0) = 1 for any generic market structure. In both of these 
cases, the branded firm essentially operates as a monopoly firm in the market. Moreover, it is 
straightforward to show that dF/dn < 0 and dF/dΦ < 0. 
In order to characterize the profit-maximizing price of the branded firm, it is necessary to compare the two 
maxima v1(pb
1
) and v2(pb
2
) with each other. The maxima of the function v2(.) is given as follows
 22 ( ) 1 .
4
b
b
s
v p

  (3.29) 
On the other hand, the maxima of the first part of the profit function (3.23) is given as 
  11( ) 1 2 ( , ) ( , ) 2 ( , ) ( , )
4 ( 1)
b b
b
s s n
v p F n F n F n F n
n
    
            
     
(1 )
( , ).
4 (1 ) 4
b b
g
s sn
F n
n ns 
  
  
     
(3.30) 
The branded firm is better off charging the monopoly price from the loyal consumers than competing with 
generic firms if and only if   
(1 )
1 ( , ) ,
(1 ) g
n
F n
n ns
 
   
  
(3.31) 
or, alternatively, when 
(2 ) .g b gn s s s     (3.32) 
If sb ≥ 2sg, the condition (3.32) cannot be met, because the left-hand side of the equality (3.32) becomes 
negative while the right-hand side is strictly positive. This implies that the profit maximizing price is (3.30) 
if the condition sb ≥ 2sg holds true. 
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If sb < 2sg, then it follows from the condition (3.32) that the market outcome is segmented, if the policy 
parameter satisfies the condition  
12
( ).
g b
g
s s n
SEG n
s
  
   (3.33) 
Since any feasible generic substitution policy must satisfy the condition 0 ≤ Φ, the other condition for the 
segmented market outcome is that the number of generic firms must be higher than (2sg - sb)/Δ. || 
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Appendix A2. Data conversions 
Excluded ATC-groups: A02BC04, C07AB12, C09CA06, C10AA04, N03AG04, N03AX16, N05AX12, 
N06AB10, N06AX21 
Excluded packet numbers: 182733, 582486, 182741, 86587, 529735, 523969, 442418, 179622, 537860, 
46987, 558536 
Exclude packets with two or more quarter’s gaps (do not allow exit from markets and re-entering). 
Exclude packets if time in the markets is strictly less than 12 quarters, with a gap of 2 quarters. 
Exclude packets if substitution takes place and removes, seven observations. 
Exclude packets if substitution does not take place before the 44
th
 quarter.
Exclude packets if price/DDD is zero or negative. 
Exclude product level (aggregated) observation if appearance in the markets is less than a year. 
Exclude liquid form drugs, undefined packet size or dosage strength as follows: 
packet size 
1 ml 
2 ml 
3 ml 
5 ml 
50 g 
10 ml 
15 ml 
20 ml 
28 ml 
40 mg 
60 ml 
70 ml 
0.5 ml 
100 ml 
120 ml 
150 ml 
200 ml 
250 ml 
300 ml 
400 ml 
50 x 1 
500 ml 
56 x 1 
800 ml 
100 x 1 
11 + 14 
20 x 10 
21 + 14 
49 + 49 
5 x 1 ml 
5 x 2 ml 
5 x 3 ml 
5 x 5 ml 
50 x 5 g 
10 x 5 ml 
28 x 10 g 
6 + 3 + 1 
100 dosage  
14 + 14 +14 
50 x 500 mg 
7 + 21 + 21 
25 mg + 2 ml 
30 + 14 + 14 
4 x 50 x 5 g 
50 mg + 2 ml 
40 mg + 10 ml 
37.5 mg + 2.0 ml 
14 + 30 + 10 + 14 
10 x 2 ml 
10 x 1 ml 
Strength 
10 mg / 12.5 mg 20 mg / 6 mg 
10 mg / 25 mg 300 microg* 
100 mg / 25 mg 4 mg / 1.25 mg 
100 microg* 40 mg / 12.5 mg 
1000 mg/dosage 42 mg Li 
16 mg / 12.5 mg 5 mg / 12.5 mg 
160 mg / 12.5 mg 50 mg / 12.5 mg 
160 mg / 25 mg 500 mg/dose 
180 mg / 2 mg 600 mg / 12.5 mg 
2.5 mg / 12.5 mg 80 mg / 12.5 mg 
20 mg / 12.5 mg 1 ED / 2 ED 
*Micrograms are converted to Mg into a new strength variable and included dataset
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